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FACULTY COMMENTS 
This paper studies the prospects for developing smallholder cash crop agriculture in 
Indonesia with a view to increasing returns to farmers. It is extensively researched, 
drawing on both historical material and current data, all of which are assembled into a 
comprehensive and convincing argument for more investment into higher-value crops and 
processing. 
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Map of Indonesian Coffee Growing Regions 
This paper focuses on the prospects for developing Indonesia's cash crop sector, particularly in light of the 
financial crisis of the last two years. The transitional nature of rice as a primary crop has led to the need for 
crop diversification. Additionally, the increased value of cash crops on the world market with the 
weakened rupiah has created a boon for rural farmers and exporters of these crops. Many of these crops 
are early in their transitional stages, and thus are prime candidates for assistance as they have the potential 
for increased yields and productivity. 
In light of these two issues ~ the need for diversification away from rice and the recent refocus on the 
agricultural sector ~ this paper will concentrate on cash crop development for export to Western 
developed countries (i.e. U.S. and Western Europe). In the short term, developed Western markets are the 
most viable targets for export due to the current recession of Japan and the general economic malaise of 
the Southeast Asian region. Thus, for the purpose of this study, the target crops should meet the following 
criteria: 1) dominated by smallholders, 2) growing demand by developed (Western) countries, and 3) have 
the potential to increase productivity i.e. are in early stages of agricultural transition. 
In addition to identifying those crops which have potential to stimulate Indonesia's economy, it is also 
important to analyze how rural small-landholders can integrate with urbanizing communities to realize 
growth and equitable economic gain. There exists an opportunity to develop the rural agricultural 
population, but in order to create sustainable growth of this sector, policy alternatives should be 
considered carefully. This requires a close study of the value chain, from the producer to marketing the 
product to consumers. Currently, there are several intermediaries in the process of getting the coffee 
cherry to the coffeepot, for example, which may or may not have inefficiencies. Additionally, it will be 
helpful to review past government policies in both the rice sector and cash crop sector, both to provide a 
context for future development and to avoid past mistakes. 
Finally, other models of rural agricultural development may serve as positive examples that could be 
transferable to Indonesia. In particular, this paper will explore the development of cocoa farming in 
Sulawesi, and coffee production in Kenya. These models identify policies and systems that helped to 
integrate the rural farming sector into the national, and ultimately, the world economy. 
I. Introduction: Theoretical Framework for Thesis 
The most distant history of Western involvement in Indonesia conjures up visions of opportunistic 
explorers, traveling long distances on European ships in search of the riches that these precious islands 
held. Valued as dearly as gold, the exotic spices grown on the Indonesian archipelago were the foundation 
for conquering and colonizing this part of the world. 
Indonesia is now known not for its spice trade, which accounts for a mere 1% of export revenues, but 
rather for its low-wage labor, fast-growing economy, and corrupted government. Since Indonesia became 
an independent nation in 1945, the priorities of its leaders have turned to building a nation and an economy 
based on industrialization. Indonesia has been swept up in a path common to the fast-growing economies 
of Southeast Asia: import substitution, followed by export orientation, attracting foreign investment, 
utilizing a large, low-wage labor pool to fill up manufacturing plants, and finally a turn towards 
value-added, technology-driven manufacturing. Indonesia's comparative advantage in agriculture was not 
seen as the wave of the future, and was not the engine of growth. 
This is not to say that the agriculture sector was completely ignored. On the contrary, President Suharto, 
who ruled the Indonesia from 1965-1998, allocated substantial resources to agricultural development, with 
a clear bias towards developing rice production. The government spent heavily on fertilizer subsidies, crop 
intensification programs and farmer training. The decision to focus so strongly on agriculture is probably 
best explained by Suharto's rural upbringing and his memory of how rice shortages destabilized Sukarno's 
(his predecessor) regime. Although farmers had no political voice to speak of, they did comparatively well 
in obtaining subsidized credit. Within a decade, 1974-1984, Indonesia moved from being the world's 
largest rice importer to self-sufficiency. 
The thrust of Suharto's agricultural development was on the island of Java, considered the political and 
economic center of the nation. Indonesia is a unique nation in its geographical layout. Consisting of 7 
major island groups, the population and environment varies widely across the archipelago. Java is the most 
densely populated and heavily farmed of the islands. On Java, the limits of arable land expansion were 
reached by 1930, after which increased productivity was due to intensification. On the other islands, the 
growth of labor-productivity was largely caused by increases in the land-labor ratio, which implies that 
producers on average expanded the area under their control. The outer islands are much less densely 
populated, and land availability makes it possible for farmers to increase acreage. Additionally, the other 
islands have traditionally grown cash crops as opposed to rice, a result of both the appropriateness of the 
land for these crops as well as government policy. 
The growth of other sectors of the economy, such as oil and manufacturing for export, has naturally led to 
a relative decline in the contribution of agriculture to GDP. Specifically, rice's contribution to the 
agriculture sector has declined in the past three decades, from 37% in 1968 to less than 25% throughout 
the 1990s. It appears that intensification programs and the "green revolution" have been fully expended 
and led to diminishing returns of rice production. Production per hectare has been leveling off since 1982, 
implying the need for crop diversification to increase employment, income, and economic growth of the 
rural economy. 
The impetus for this paper is drawn not only from the need for crop diversification in the rural sector, but 
also from the recent financial crisis in Asia that has hit Indonesia particularly hard, and resulted in a drastic 
depreciation of its currency. The exchange rate dropped from 2100 rupiah per dollar in April 1997 to an all 
, time low of 11,000 rupiah per dollar in March of 1998. In the midst of this downturn, farming has been 
one of the only sectors to see economic gain. The rupiah's fall has made dollar-based exports of 






gricultural Policy in Indonesia after 1966 
production reached self-sufficiency and stabilized at adequate levels. To be internationally competitive and 
gain foreign exchange reserves, much needed to be done to improve cash crop performance. Some of these 
domestic policies are described below. 
fif rent Policies and Programs 
Since the late 1980s, the government and export groups such as AEKI (Indonesian Coffee Exporters 
Association) have implemented a countrywide program of "intensification" aimed at improving existing 
crops. This includes policies that encourage rehabilitation and intensification efforts to increase yield and 
improve crop quality, and discourage expansion of planted area. For example, AEKI, together with village 
cooperatives and the Department of Agriculture, offer extension services to coffee farmers to improve 
coffee quality and provide high-yield arabica seedlings to replace robusta at appropriate elevations, as well 
as providing high-yield robusta varieties. 
The government has also made fertilizers and pesticides, which help improve both yields and quality, 
available at Village Unit Cooperatives throughout the country. However, they are not heavily used by 
smallholders, probably due to the added cost. These additives have been subsidized in the past, but the 
government has been increasing price ceilings and gradually dropping these subsidies since the mid-1990s. 
Thus, it is primarily large private and government owned plantation that can afford to apply fertilizer and 
pesticides on a regular basis. This increases production levels and exportable quality of produce for these 
large minority growers, but has not benefited smallholders. 
Other reforms do seem aimed at helping the smallholder; the government acknowledges that commercial 
cash crops provide one method to lift rural incomes and slow labor migration to the cities. Agronomists 
say there is great potential for cash crops to reduce poverty because of the large investments already made 
in these crops and because of the large pool of experienced farmers in Indonesia. (Schwarz, 1990) H.S. 
Dillon, an advisor to Agriculture Minister Wardoyo, sees the success of the rice industry as hope for future 
improvements in cash crops. "Going by our experiences with rice, we have found that organizing farms is 
possible; they are quite open to new technology and respond to incentives." (Schwarz, 1990) One scheme 
to address this potential development aims to bring smallholders into working relationships with bigger, 
more sophisticated farmers. This program, called NES, requires an investor to sell 80% of his land to 
smallholders while developing the remaining land in the center. The center becomes a production area to 
process the crop, which the investor guarantees to buy from the smallholders. The government planned to 
finance the smallholders' purchase of these plots, but budget austerity in the 90s has severely limited the 
government's reach. 
Another development that may hold more promise is Agrobank, opened in February 1990. One major 
obstacle to improving planting techniques has been the cost of capital. This bank offers agro-management 









coffee exporters grow coffee as a cash crop and rely heavily on coffee revenues for foreign exchange. If 
supply and demand is allowed to float in a free-market system, price fluctuations of coffee could severely 
impact these countries economies. Additionally, for several coffee-producing countries, there is no viable 
alternative to coffee, and thus they have no backup source of revenue if a price drop occurs. Under the 
quota system, ICO producer countries exported set amounts to ICO consumer countries, stabilizing both 
supply and demand and keeping prices within a predictable band. In general, quotas were set according to 
producing countries shares of world production. 
By 1989, however, the ICO failed to implement quotas and price stability effectively. Coffee producing 
countries produced more than they were allowed according to the quotas, mainly in response to an 
increase in world demand. These countries found a market for their over-quota coffee in non-traditional 
markets, non-ICO members, and in whomever would buy outside of the quotas. This increase in supply led 
to a decrease in prices and consequently the demise of the ICO. The ICO no longer tries to regulate coffee 
trade, but functions as an information center for the coffee industry. It hopes to help stabilize prices by 
giving the market a clear picture of the coffee market through newsletters and publications. Without good, 
reliable information, prices are often based on rumors and speculation which can cause distortions in the 
market 
The breakdown of the ICO be^an with a two-vear suspension of coffee nuotas after a failure to modify the 
quota system in June of 1989. Indonesia was a contributor to the breakdown, since it contested the ICO's 
quota proposals, arguing that they did not fairly reflect Indonesia's potential. (For example, production in 
1988 was 385,000 tons, and the proposed quota was only 220,000 tons.) Prior to the breakdown, 
Indonesia's allotment was only 5.2%, against the 7% it feels is commensurate with its output. The board of 
the ICO argued this lower allotment was partially due to Indonesia's reputation for selling poor quality 
coffee, and the lower demand for Robusta beans on the world market. Conversely, Indonesian officials 
claim discrimination is the root cause of the lower quotas, as the ICO is a Latin American-dominated 
organization that Indonesia contends is biased against Asian producers. 
Additionally, the ICO's 1989 proposals attempted to apply quotas to non-ICO members, primary markets 
for coffee produced above quota. This is evidenced by Indonesia's export statistics in 1988, one year prior 
to the breakdown: 135,000 tons of coffee was exported to ICO member countries, and another 135,000 
tons was exported to non-members. Although it was acknowledged that suspension of quotas would drive 
prices and export revenue down in the short term, Indonesian officials welcomed the suspension. "It's 
better to get a suspension of quotas than to get a bad agreement," said Daryono Kertosastro, chairman of 
the AEKJ. (Schwarz, 1989) Without the quotas, it was believed that Indonesia would be able to gain more 
of the world market share. 
However, the realities of a free market system have led to oversupply and a substantial decline in prices, 
hurting farmers, processors, and exporters. In 1991, approximately 85% of Indonesia's coffee exporters 
faced bankruptcy, mostly due to the fact that coffee prices on the international market dropped to their 
lowest point since the early 1960s, $0.84/kg. When the quotas were suspended in 1989, Daryono seemed 
to believe that despite foreign exchange earnings declines, Indonesia could "survive lower prices because 
coffee production from our farmers is quite cost efficient" (Schwarz, 1989) Apparently, the drop in coffee 
proceeds was more than Indonesia's coffee producers could take - by 1991 AEKI and the Indonesian 
government were lobbying for a revival of the quota system. 
The quota system has not been reinstated to date, and coffee prices have been volatile, varying from 
$0.50/ib. to a record high of $3.18/ib. From 1989-1994, coffee prices were relatively stable, varying from 
$0.50-$ 1.00/ lb. This low price caused a shakeout in the industry, as many coffee producers lost money at 




and large-scale millers. Because it takes hundreds of farmers to create a quantity of coffee large enough foi 
export, it would be difficult to transfer this power to them. Such a large mass of farmers would need to be 
educated, mobilized, and empowered. "Farmers have no idea of what goes into making good coffee," said 
Knox. "The control of adding value is not with the farmer." 
The Kenva Model 
Kenya has developed a system to grow and market its coffees with very different methods from other 
countries, which has helped to make it "the producing country with the highest overall quality."(Knox, 
1998) Much like Indonesia, Kenya has a fast-growing population and limited arable land. Given these' 
circumstances, the Kenyans realized that they needed a high return on each pound of coffee, one of their 
leading exports. Farmers wanted to ensure that their coffee demanded a consistently high price, which 
could only be done by creating a high enough quality coffee that consuming countries would compete with 
each other for access to each harvest. The slopes of Mount Kenya provided fertile ground and an ideal 
microclimate for cultivating Arabica coffee that generated this kind of demand. In addition to this, Kenya 
has some of the most sophisticated scientific research into coffee quality anywhere in the world. 
Like Indonesia, Kenya's coffee is grown by small farmers with tiny plots of land. But while Indonesian 
smallholders inadvertently compromise the quality of their harvests through unskillful backyard washing 
and drying, Kenya's small farmers have organized themselves into cooperatives, each of which has a 
centralized wet processing facility with skilled operators. These co-ops produce small quantities of coffee, 
from 20 to 100 bags at a time, which are then auctioned off to buyers. 
The auction system allows farmers to be directly rewarded for quality. Normally, importers, exporters, and 
buyers in consuming countries control the price of coffee, with the actual growers reaping only a tiny ' 
fraction of the final price. In the Kenyan system, each parcel of coffee produced is delivered to a 
centralized mill in Nairobi where samples are drawn and tasted. Expert tasters rate each sample on a 1-10 
scale for flavor, acidity, and body, and growers (but not prospective buyers) receive a copy of these 
results. Prospective buyers are then sent samples of each coffee to taste and evaluate prior to the next 
week's auction. At the auction, the bidding sorts out the lower from the higher quality coffees. Sometimes, 
the better lots go for two or three times the price of average offerings. The money goes directly to farmers', 
who run small but excellent operations. They all contribute to the Kenya Coffee Board and Mill, which 
conducts research and grading, but they still receive 86% of the total price obtained by their coffee. 
The possibilities for implementing this model in Indonesia would be limited by the expanse and 
geographical separation of the Indonesian coffee-producing areas (North Sumatra, South Sumatra, 
Sulawesi, Bali, Java, Timor, Irian Jaya) which are on different islands or do not have an easily accessible 
central location such as Nairobi. Also, Indonesia is subject to a high degree of corruption, which may 
interfere with the grading system if bribing occurred between graders, farmers, and buyers. One solution 
to mitigate these problems is to implement this type of program on a smaller scale. In fact, farmers in East 
Timor have organized into cooperatives similar to those in Kenya. According to Sam Filiaci, of the 
National Cooperative Business Association of Indonesia (NCBA), all farmers in East Timor (13,000 
families at this time) are organized into 16 primary and one secondary cooperative. They do all of the 
procurement, processing, and export of the coffee. The secondary cooperative federation in Dili has the 
export license and receives the export payment proceeds. These small farmers use wet-processing, which 
is more appropriate for Arabica coffee. This technology was brought to the small farmers through the 
NCBA. According to Filiaci, the farmers do not need to utilize credit because it is a low input/ low output 
farming system. About 75% of the coffee produced is Arabica, and 60% of the demand is the U.S. 
specialty market. The other major importers are in the main European, North American, and Japanese 
markets, and the co-op farmers market their coffee directiy to the importers. 
Coffee 
It appears that the cooperative nature of the Timor system is similar to that in Kenya. However it lacks 
the tasting/rating and auctioning processes. The benefit of the tasting/rating system is that it allows 
farmers to understand more about what is required for a "quality" cup of coffee. Also, they know the 
value of their coffee before it is auctioned off, so they are not undersold. Since Timor'coffee has gained a 
good reputation internationally, it commands a higher price, but the farmers do not know on what element 
their coffee is being rated. Also, prices are not differentiated through an auction, so the prices are 
determined by importers and exporters. In short, the Kenyan system gives more control to the farmers by 
educating them about the quality of their coffee through objective and market forces (tasting/rating and 
auctioning.) 
The Timor case may be an excellent opportunity to implement a "pilot" of the Kenyan model since it has 
the cooperative structure already in place. To implement the model, the cooperatives would need to have 
a tasting/research facility, which could administered by the NCBA and AEKI. By involving the AEKI 
several exporters could learn the process of the model so that it could be adapted and implemented in othei 
areas. The AEKI would be an ideal partner since it has 12 provincial offices in major producing or 
exporting centers throughout Indonesia, and it already does extensive work on improving productivity 
quality, and marketing of smallholder coffee. It also is an important counterpart for the Government in 
dealing with coffee trade and development. 
The benefits of implementing this model include a higher priced coffee and higher returns to farmers 
elevated international reputation of Indonesian coffee, more highly educated farmers, incentives for ' 
farmers to grow the highest quality coffee, improved processing methods, and a more stable income for 
farmers (i.e. mcomes would not be as influenced by coffee prices on the world market). 
Although recent cost information was not available, the benefits of converting from Robusta to Arabica 
coffee growing indicate a substantial revenue increase. The annual average price of a kilogram of Arabica 
from 1996 to 1998 was $4.16, versus $1.74 for Robusta. Currently, there are approximately 78 000 
hectares of land under Arabica cultivation, and over 1 million hectares of land under Robusta cultivation 
Although yields of Arabica are generally lower than Robusta (due to intercropping, fragility of crop versus 
Robusta, and stricter quality specifications), the economic gain of growing Arabica is substantial Using a 
yield rate of 300/kg per hectare for Arabica and 400/kg per hectare for Robusta (ICO 1998) if 25% of 
Robusta crops were converted to Arabica, the increase in total revenues for Indonesia would'be 
approximately $151 million, or an 18% increase. On the individual farmer level, the increase would be 
even greater, as indicated below: 

Coffee 
assistance of U.S. importers such as Holland Coffee Company and Forest Trade. Farmers have not grown 
organic coffee as a reaction to increased Western demand; it is an outcome of prohibitive prices and lack 
of access to pesticides and fertilizers. Thus, the concept of marketing coffee with an organic benefit, 
including the regulations involved, is and area unfamiliar to coffee farmers. Continued education from 
Western companies as well as assistance from AEKI and ICCRI could help farmers more fully capitaUze 
on this opportunity. 
B 
TV.B. The Case of Spires 
Brief History Spice. Trade 
Spices were some of the first items sought after in Europe from abroad, and were an impetus for the 
beginnings of international trade. During the Middle Ages in Europe, a pound of ginger was worth the 
price of a sheep; a pound of mace would buy three sheep or half cow; cloves cost the equivalent of about 
$20 a pound. Pepper, always the greatest prize, was counted out peppercorn by peppercorn. In the 11th 
Century, many towns kept their accounts in pepper and taxes and rents were assessed and paid in this 
spice. Many of these spices were found on the islands of what is now Indonesia. Marco Polo, who 
voyaged across Asia in the late 13th century, wrote of Java, "from thence also is obtained the greatest part 
of the spices that are distributed throughout the world." 
Portugal remained dominant in the Far Eastern spice lands until the end of the 16th Century, when the 
Dutch entered the competition in earnest. Van Houtman and Van Neck, each in command of expeditions 
to the Indies, made friends with native sultans, and organized trading posts which eventually gave their 
country a monopoly in the early 17th Century. With the Dutch conquest of Malacca in 1641 the Malay 
Peninsula and northern Sumatra came under their control. 
In 1650 the Dutch took over the cinnamon trade in Ceylon, and by 1663 the best pepper ports of the 
Malabar Coast were theirs. Before the end of the 17th Century, Macassar on the Island of Celebes and 
Bantam in Java were added to make the Dutch complete masters of the immensely profitable spice trade. 
The Dutch ruled the market with a rod of iron. If the price of cinnamon fell too low in Amsterdam, they 
burned the spice. They soaked their nutmegs in milk of lime, a process which did not affect flavor, but 
supposedly killed the germ of the nut. This was to prevent nutmegs from being planted elsewhere.' 
France's role in spice trading was generally a minor one, not backed by its government However, they 
helped destroy the century-old Dutch spice monopoly when, in 1770, the French contrived to "kidnap" 
enough cloves, cinnamon and nutmeg plants from Dutch possessions to begin spice-growing in the French 
islands of Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles in the Indian Ocean and in French Guiana on the north coast 
of South America. 
Meanwhile, the sea-faring English were not idle. They, too, were looking for routes to the riches of the 
East. Throughout the 1500s, the British searched for a passage to India and the Indies by way of a 
Northern route, but had little success. Yet, the extensive exploration and navigation of the seas made 
England a power at sea. In 1600 the British East India Company was chartered by Queen Elizabeth, with 
spice cargoes as its big objective. Where the Dutch controlled the East Indies, the English were gaining 
supremacy on the mainland of India itself. In 1780, the Dutch and the English fought a war, which was to 
be ruinously costly to the Dutch East India Company. In 1795 the English took Malacca and a year later all 
Dutch property and trading centers except Java. The Dutch East India Company had to be dissolved in 
1799. 
It was not until the mid-1700s that America entered the spice trade in a big way. The leader of the 
American spice trade was a sea captain named Jonathan Carnes. Sailing on one of the early American 
trading voyages out of Salem in 1778, he discovered places in the Orient, principally in Sumatra, where he 
could deal directly with the natives, thus circumventing the Dutch monopoly. Financially backed'by a 
wealthy Salem family, he made a voyage in 1795 which yielded 700% profit in spices. This sent America 
into the spice competition so actively that between 1784 and 1873, about a thousand vessels made the 
24,000 mile-long trip to Sumatra and back. In 1818, when the pepper trade was particularly intense, 35 
vessels made the long and dangerous trip. Pepper trade furnished a great part of the import duties collected 
m Salem (which at one point were enough to pay 5% of expenses of the entire U.S. government). Pirates 
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aromatherapy and food flavoring. There has been an increasing demand for "all-natural" ingredients in 
hair, shampoo, skin and cosmetic products in the U.S., which is opening up a sizable market for natural 
aromatherapy oils. While the demand for such oils originated in smaller natural products companies, large 
companies such as S.C. Johnson, Clairol, and Estee Lauder have more recently created products that use 
these oils for their fragrance and medicinal benefits. 
Indonesian Spices in the US 
Indonesia is a source of many spices that are popular and growing in demand. To identify which spices in 
particular have seen a rise in demand, it will be helpful to look at the amounts of specific spices imported 
to the U.S. in the past several years. 
Although data was not available on country of origin for these imports, the purpose of studying the 
quantities of imports is to discover which spices that are grown in Indonesia have seen a rise in U.S. 
demand. Clearly, pepper is the largest in terms of sheer quantity, but ginger and cinnamon have seen 
significant increases as well. Having identified these three spices as potential sources of increased demand 
in the U.S., looking at the export and yield data for each spice will identify the opportunities for Indonesian 
production. 

These graphs indicate that there is potential to increase yields in pepper, nutmeg, and cinnamon. Ginger, 
on the other hand, has seen yields move generally at the same rate as production, as acreage has remained 
relatively flat. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the crops of pepper, nutmeg, and cinnamon will be 
examined. Ginger may provide an opportunity, and deserves further study, but does not meet the criteria 
of being at an early stage in agricultural transition. To understand the dynamics and possibilities for each 
of these spices, it will be helpful to have a brief explanation about where they are grown and some of the 
history behind their development. 
Cmnamon 
There are several varieties of trees in what botanists call the "cinnamomum" family. Most of the cinnamon 
used in the U.S. is derived from trees of the "cinnamolnum cassia" division of the family, which is why 
cinnamon is sometimes referred to as cassia. Among spice experts, this term is used to distinguish between 
the cassia types of cinnamon and the Ceylon type of cinnamon. The cassia group is native to China, 
Indo-China and Indonesia. They produce the product most Americans recognize as cinnamon -- a reddish 
brown powder with a strong characteristic aroma and flavor. Quite 
different from these are the Ceylon and Ceylon-types of cinnamon. The products in this case are 
characteristically tan-colored, with flavor and aroma much milder than that of cassia that the average 
person in the U.S. would consider 
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them weak or poor cinnamon. Most Ceylon cinnamon brought into the U.S. is re-exported to Mexico, 
where it is preferred for certain confections. In labeling, however, bark from the cinnamomum family 
(whether cassia or Ceylon-type) may be called "cinnamon." 
The most commonly used cinnamon in the U.S. comes from the cassia type of cinnamon trees, for which 
there are three main producing areas. Indonesia supplies two types: "Korintje" and "Vera" (or "Batavia"). 
China, now that the U.S. has resumed trade with that country, is an increasingly important source. 
Vietnam is the third producing area, (known for "Saigon" cinnamon). 
Indonesian cinnamons (cassia) come from the mountainous areas inland from the port of Padang on the 
island of Sumatra. The highest concentrations of essential oil in Korintje and Vera are found in the thicker 
bark on the lower parts of the trees. The grade designations for both cinnamons are "Quality A": (quills 
must be one meter long, taken from the main trunk), "Quality B": (from the side branches) and "Quality 
C": (broken pieces). Coming from a higher altitude, the Korintje cinnamon characteristically has a slightly 
more intensive color and flavor than the Vera and is thus rated the better type. In general, Korintje is deep 
reddish brown and has a sharp cinnamon flavor; the Vera is lighter in color. 
The U.S. is the largest importer of cinnamon, and imports have been rising gradually, especially since 
1982. The average annual volume of cinnamon world trade is 35,000 tons. In the wake of the recent 
financial crisis and adverse weather conditions, cinnamon was an alternative crop that Indonesian farmers 
turned to when faced with devastated rice crops and the devaluation of the rupiah. This increased 
production drove export prices to 40 cents per pound in 1997, down from 80 cents per pound in the same 
period of 1996. This is likely a short-term phenomenon, however, as the effects of El Nino subside and 
supply of cinnamon returns to levels more commensurate with demand. 
Nutmeg and Mace 
Nutmeg is the seed of the pala fruit tree, found close to the sea in well-drained areas of some tropical 
islands. The seed is partially covered by a thin red membrane that when removed and dried becomes the 
spice called mace. Both are enclosed within a hard shell inside the fruit. Indonesian nutmeg and mace are 
grown on the islands of Sian and northern Sulawesi, and the processing center is in Menado. Smaller 
amounts are grown in Maluku, Aceh, West Java, Irian Jaya, and West Sumatra. Most of the East Indian 
product today arrives in the U.S. cracked and cleaned, ready to be ground (whole nutmegs cannot be fed 
directly into a grinding system). Indonesian nutmeg is highly aromatic, with a distinctively characteristic 
bouquet. It tests high in steam volatile oil, but not as high (as the West Indian) in fixed oils, making it an 
excellent choice for grinding and use in the ground form. 
Indonesia produces more than three-quarters of the world's output of nutmeg and mace, and has been the 
world's dominant source of these spices for hundreds of years. In 1986, the Indonesian government 
introduced export regulations that facilitated cartelization of the market, and prices of nutmeg and mace on 
the world market increased dramatically. These regulations allowed exports only by approved traders, who 
were members of ASPIN (Asosiasi Pala Indonesia), and required exports to be coordinated and restricted 
by the ASPIN marketing board. Subsequently, a cartel agreement was made with Grenada, which exports 
20% of total world nutmeg exports. Problems such as accumulation of unsold stocks and smuggling of 
nutmeg and mace through Singapore led the Indonesian government to abolish the regulations in 1990. 
Other goals of the deregulation were to create greater business opportunities, raise farm productivity, and 
diversify the market. 
Since deregulation, prices of nutmeg and mace have dropped drastically, and now Indonesia earns only 
about $7 million in export revenues compared with more than $42 million in the late 80s. Because of this, 
there is a temptation to return to regulations like those in effect from 1986-90. Indonesian nutmeg and 
B 
mace exporters have repeatedly called for reregulation, not surprisingly, since they benefited the most fror 
the controls through increased prices. Although farmers did receive an increase in revenues, from 
approximately Rp 500 per kilogram in 1985 to a high of nearly Rp 4000 in 1988, exporters and foreign 
traders earned much more. Exporters' margins went from about Rp 2000 to Rp 9000, while foreign 
traders' margins increased from just over Rp 2000 to Rp 12,000. Additionally, the control of supply was 
at the exporter level rather than the farmer level. This created a situation of exporter monopoly power 
over both foreign buyers and domestic sellers, and farmers continued to accumulate unsold stocks. It was 
costly to produce output and not sell it, so smuggling became an alternative outlet for excess nutmeg and 
mace supply. Also, as prices increased on the world market, demand for exports declined, but the 
decreased demand never influenced farmer production. This is partly due to the nature of nutmeg 
production, which is highly inelastic. There are only a few crops to substitute for nutmeg, and it is difficul 
and costly to switch to new crops. Also, limited availability of rural credit makes it difficult for farmers to 
withhold supplies in response to price falls. 
The return to regulated nutmeg trade is not probable, especially in light of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
in 1997. One part of these agreements was the Agreement on Agriculture, which lays the foundation for 
reducing distortions in agricultural trade and for the gradual establishment of a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system. Additionally, according to Article 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards, 
"spice-producing countries will no longer be able to resort to minimum 
restraints or to form cartels and associations for the purpose of imposing such measures" (International 
Trade Forum, 1/12/97). Thus, to ensure positive development of international trade, it is unlikely that the 
cartel will be reestablished. 
About 12,000 tons of nutmeg and mace are traded annually, with the United States as the largest single 
importing market. Recently, the price of nutmeg has soared from Rp 2500 to Rp 140,000 per kilo, due to 
a resurgence in global demand for the spice, combined with the weaker rupiah. Consumption is generally 
steady in the United States, but rises in October through December as seasonal usage comes into play. 
New uses, such as aromatherapy oils, perfumes, and essential oils used as food flavorings may help to 
boost demand. 
Pepper 
In terms of both volume and value, pepper ranks as the main spice in international trade. Historically, 
pepper has been one of the most sought after spices of the Orient, and the island of Sumatra produced a 
considerable supply. Pepper was valuable not only for its ability to flavor food, but also for its preservative 
qualities. In 1805, Indonesian pepper exports reached a level of 7 million pounds; in 1997 the U.S. 
imported 41,602 tons of whole black peppercorns. Of this, India supplied 44% and Indonesia 41%. The 
U.S. is the largest market for pepper, accounting for 25% of world trade. Total would trade amounts to 
$564 million or 140, 000 tons. 
Pepper in Indonesia is principally grown on the island of Sumatra, a major producer of fine quality black 
pepper. Cultivation is centered in the Lampong district of southeastern Sumatra and shipments are made 
from the port of Pandjang. This pepper compares with pungency and flavor, testing high in steam volatile 
oil and non-volatile extract. Pepper is commonly intercropped with other cash crops, such as coffee and 
tobacco. Although the income per hectare is higher for perennial plants such as pepper, it takes many years 
before these plants bear fruit. Farmers have to wait five years before they begin to harvest. Pepper also 
requires a large initial investment in seedlings, supports, and fences, plus the opportunity cost of a 
perennial crop with delayed yielding. 
Pepper demand has experienced steady growth of about 4% in the past several years. Increased 
purchasing power throughout the 1980s in some Middle East and North African countries save rise to 
sharp increases in pepper consumption. The U.S.' demand has also risen, from 60.5 million pounds in 
1985 to 78.5 million pounds in 1995. Recently, there has been a surge in prices for pepper due to increased 
demand, damaged crops caused by El Nino weather conditions, and looting in Indonesia. According to 
one supplier, "raw material pepper prices have reached levels never before experienced." (Chemical 
Market Reporter, 7/28/97) According to the International Pepper Community, "world pepper demand 
will continue to outstrip supply for the next 10-15 years." (The Financial Post, 3/7/97) The 800% increase 
in prices from 1997 to 1998 forced a shake out of Indonesian pepper exporters, from 42 to 8 companies. 
The huge working capital needed at the farmer level weakened the purchasing power of exporters, and 
forced many of them out of business. Those farmers who have maintained production are gaining 
substantially, earning Rp 43,000 (US$4.30) per kilogram versus Rp 5000 (US$2.00) a year ago. 
Recommendations 
The islands of Indonesia hold a comparative advantage in spices which can be exploited as the demand for 
spices rises in the U.S. and other developed economies. In addition to their role as a foreign exchange 
earner, spices can act as a stimulus for rural growth. Spices are generally suitable as a smallholder 
backyard crop, as is the case for the majority of spices grown in Indonesia. Furthermore, spices can be 
cultivated on slopes and other marginal lands that are unsuitable for other crops. This makes many spice 
crops an excellent secondary crop, and perfect for intercropping with crops like coffee. Spices and 
essential oils offer further advantages of being relatively low volume, long-storage items, important in 
Indonesia's more remote areas where transportation is limited. 
The potential for value-added exports, including grinded spices, essential oils, spice mixtures, and 
oleoresins is growing for some spices, as shown by the increasing demand from developed countries. By 
adding value before export, Indonesian farmers could gain a more substantial portion of the end value of 
the product. Possibilities include development of oil distillation plants, grinding facilities, and seminars to 
discuss new end-uses for spice products. One example of value-added processing has occurred in 
Grenada, which has established a nutmeg oil distillery. This made economic sense, in light of the fact that 
nutmeg oil has experienced increasing demand, while demand for whole raw nutmegs has not grown. The 
distillery can also be used to make oil from mace, cinnamon, and clove, offering further diversification for 
Grenada's spice sector. 
The possibilities for adding value go beyond simple processing. Production of soaps, lotions, shampoos, 
and food items with essential oils would integrate the rural and manufacturing sectors, a relationship that 
has been limited in Indonesia thus far. Further usage of spices downstream into end products could create 
larger manufacturing opportunities, but would also require more sophisticated marketing and 
manufacturing facilities than do raw commodities. It should be pointed out that adding value may make 
sense for some spices and not for others. The value of some spices in their raw state makes it less 
worthwhile to invest in the processing and manufacturing facilities needed for end products. To determine 
the possibilities, each spice should be considered individually. Nutmeg oil, for example, is used by many 
food manufacturers in meat products and bakery goods. It is also used to manufacture perfumes and to an 
extent in the pharmaceutical industry. In general, the demand for products and scope of usage should be 
determined prior to investment in value-added processing. 
The maintenance of quality and safety of spices is of prime concern to the spice industry. Care must be 
taken in harvesting and handling of spices so as to prevent microbiological contamination. Especially in 
the industrial sector, a niche of spice trade that is important for export expansion, the confidence of the 
user in quality and safety is crucial. Quality assurance needs to commence at the farm and follow through 
to exports. This can be done through adoption of appropriate post-harvest handling methods, adequate 
storage facilities, and suitable packaging. India provides an interesting case for improving the quality and 
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The Indonesian island of Sulawesi has experienced rapid and unusual growth in cocoa production since 
1980, surprising the world and making it the world's third largest cocoa producer. It is a major generator 
of export revenue, bringing in $166 million in 1993. From 1981 to 1996, the volume of cocoa beans 
exported has increased from approximately 7000 tons to 275,000 tons. Notable about this expansion is 
that the engine of growth has been smallholders, and that these farmers have come to enjoy a high 
proportion of the returns from cocoa exports. This case study, therefore, has the objective of identifying 
those characteristics of cocoa production and marketing that may be transferable to other smallholder 
export crops in Indonesia. 
The production boom of cocoa in Indonesia was spurred by high world cocoa prices in the late 1970s, 
prompted by a sharp reduction in output from West Africa and the Dominican Republic. The increase in 
demand encouraged smallholders to invest in cocoa production, and total smallholder acreage expanded 
over 30-fold between 1980-1995, from 13,125 ha in 1980 to 418,400 ha in 1995. During the same time 
period, smallholder production increased from about 1000 tons to over 200,000 tons, and their share of 
total production (vs. private estates and government-owned estates) increased from 10% to 73%. Reasons 
for the success of the smallholder farmers include: an abundance of land available for cocoa production in 
Southeast Sulawesi, knowledge and capital disseminated by farmers who had experience farming in Sabah, 
Malaysia, government policy that required dissemination of seed from government and private plantations, 
and adequate transport infrastructure. Additionally, the cost of production for Indonesian cocoa 
smallholders is among the lowest in the world, due to efficient production methods, inexpensive labor, and 
a suitable climate and soil. Finally, smallholder entrepreneurship and a highly competitive marketing system 
with limited government intervention contributed to the expansion of cocoa production since 1980. 
The chart below indicates that most of the increase in production has come as a result of land expansion 
rather than intensification of crop production. Yields have remained constant, while the area harvested has 
grown rapidly. Cocoa production has not yet reached a transitional stage that would encourage 
intensification. However, the area harvested began to level off in 1993, and dropped in 1998. Thus, it 
appears that the time may be appropriate for a focus on intensification efforts, which would increase' 
yields. Issues such as crop quality, research, disease prevention, and deforestation prevention are concerns 
closely related to a transition by means of crop intensification. These issues are discussed below. 
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Marketing and Distribution 
Unique to Indonesia's cocoa industry is its free marketing and pricing system. In most African 
cocoa-producing nations, a government marketing board controls prices, which benefits particular groups 
of people within a country at the expense of farmers. The administered prices also lead to inefficiencies 
because they do not transmit market signals correctly. This leads to distortions in resource allocation and 
an environment in which farmers cannot respond to fluctuations in world supply and demand (i.e. isolatior 
from the market). 
The free trade regime in South Sulawesi, on the other hand, has created a competitive environment and 
low marketing and distribution margins. The world price for cocoa is highly correlated with the fob (freigh 
on board) price at Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi's major port), indicating that the system is transparent and 
pricing is competitive. Farmers have also benefited from a relatively good transport infrastructure in major 
producing areas, which has meant relatively low transport costs. Finally, cocoa is not subject to large 
government levies such as export taxes. These factors have allowed smallholder farmers to receive a high 
share of the export price for cocoa. A study done in 1995 found that cocoa farmers in South Sulawesi 
received 90% of fob prices. Some crops, such as cassava, generate only 18% of the fob price for farmers. 
Government, Policies 
As mentioned above, the government of Indonesia has had a mostly hands-off policy with regards to cocoa 
production. The only tax producers are subject to is a value added tax imposed in 1995. The government 
food logistics agency, Bulog, has no involvement with cocoa. Export commodities such as cocoa have alsc 
benefited from macroeconomic policies that have created a favorable exchange rate and low inflation. For 
example, the real devaluation of the rupiah in 1986 meant higher real producer prices for exports. This of 
course is also true at the present time, in the midst of a financial crisis which has devalued the rupiah 
considerably. Also, the government has invested in rural infrastructure in the Outer Islands, such as roads 
and schools, which has helped to keep transportation costs down and encouraged expansion of smallholder 
cocoa. 
Two other government initiatives were a tree crop rehabilitation program and a smallholder plantation 
development program. The first mainly benefited estate holders, but it did provide smallholders with cocoa 
seeds. The second initiative was called P2WK (Perkembangan Perkebunan Wilayah Khusus, Plantation 
Development in Special Areas). It was aimed at smallholders and provided them with modest grants and 
reimbursement of land preparation, planting costs, and seedlings. Although the program increased planted 
area by 205,296 ha (of which about 63,000 was cocoa), it was criticized for targeting areas where the 
infrastructure was not adequate and the soil quality and climate were unsuitable. 
Issues 
Although the growth in production and exports has been remarkable in the past 18 years, there are several 
issues which must be addressed to maintain healthy, sustainable growth in the cocoa sector. These include 
quality, export marketing, oversupply on the world market, and disease and deforestation. 
The quality issues involves the processing of cocoa beans, which can be sold either fermented or 
unfermented. Fermented beans are used for chocolate production and require a longer time to process, and 
sell at a price premium to unfermented beans. Unfermented beans are lower quality and used primarily'for 
cocoa butter production. They take only 1-2 days of processing, and sell at a price discount of about $100 
per ton, or 7% of the value. Cocoa bean production in Indonesia is primarily unfermented, driven by the 
decline in production of unfermented cocoa by the Dominican Republic in the early 1980s. The Indonesian 
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Cocoa Association, Askindo, has encouraged farmers to produce fermented beans in order to tap the 
premium market. However, there is little reliable and concrete information about price premiums passed or 
to farmers, and currently, there is sufficient demand for unfermented beans. 
In order to switch farmers to production of fermented beans, several free market mechanisms will have to 
operate. First, transparency in price information (through media such as radio broadcasts) is necessary, to 
let farmers know the potential earnings increase they could gain from fermented bean production. Next, 
the premium paid for fermented cocoa bean exports needs to be passed back to farmers to reward them for 
their extra efforts. Exporters, middlemen, and farmers need to make sales and purchases at premium prices 
at every stage in the marketing chain. If one link does not pass along a premium, then it will never reach 
the farmer, and he will not be incentivized to produce the higher quality beans. Direct government 
intervention, such as export controls, would not be as effective as implementing mechanisms to ensure that 
the market can operate freely. 
Another issue is export marketing, which includes a warehouse receipt proposal and risk management. 
Cocoa exporters, as they become more established and financially well-off, they are becoming more 
conservative and protective of their gained interests. An example of this is their resistance to a warehouse 
receipt system proposed by one of the world's largest cocoa brokerage houses. Under this system, any 
exporter can deliver cocoa to a warehouse in Ujung Pandang, have the quality checked, and obtain receipts 
which can be used as collateral against loans. The loans are provided by banks and the warehouse 
operators. The advantages of this system are increased liquidity and greater transparency in price 
differentials depending on quality. Large, established exporters are resisting this system because it takes 
away their advantages in providing financing to middlemen and collectors, and it also takes away their 
control of determining good quality cocoa. The warehouse system would be an objective source of 
grading cocoa, whereas the current system allows the exporter to gain extra profits by sorting cocoa by 
grade and selling sorted good quality cocoa at a premium. 
The risk management issue involves the ability of smaller exporters and middlemen to use instruments 
such as futures, options, and forward contracts. Large exporters are able to do this through overseas 
brokers, which may give them an advantage in securing cash flows. The Ministry of Trade needs to 
consider how to make these instruments accessible to smaller operators. 
A third issue is oversupply on the world market. In commodity markets, the "adding up" problem can 
occur when the incremental growth in the production of a commodity results in an increase in export 
revenue proportionally much less than the rise in volume production. This will lead to depressed world 
cocoa prices, which would undermine the welfare of cocoa producers. This possibility may encourage the 
government to impose export controls to restrain increases in cocoa production. However, export 
regulations in the past have led to problems such as smuggling and corruption. 
The environmental issues surrounding cocoa production also are cause for concern. The cocoa pod-borer 
was the main reason for stagnation of Indonesia's cocoa sector in the early 20th century, an insect pest that 
drastically reduces yield. Measures for controlling this pest include eradication of affected cocoa trees and 
application of chemicals. Both of these measures are costly and resisted by farmers. Since this insect has 
the potential of destroying the cocoa subsector, stronger government support is needed to devise better 
control methods through research, extension, and mobilization of smallholders. Another environmental 
concern is deforestation. Many of the cocoa fields in Sulawesi were created by opening up forests, which 
carries the risk of erosion, reduction of watershed areas, and loss of biodiversity. To counter this trend, 
new plantings of cocoa could be directed towards relatively degraded or underutilized land rather than 
forest areas. Sulawesi has large grassland and scrub areas, which could be used productively if not 
severely degraded. Another way to mitigate deforestation is to identify and demarcate the vulnerable and 

]ase study. Cocoa production in Sulawesi 
chain with low intermediary margins, thus rewarding the farmer according to price fluctuations on a 
worldwide level. Other cash crops in Indonesia could benefit if the government allowed similar market 
mechanisms to operate. Policy to improve transportation, support extension services, and strengthen 
research on improving yields and preventing disease would also assist in sustainable, healthy, and profitable 




Sumatra. This also means that increased productivity (for rice or cash crops) must come from 
intensification or expansion into marginal lands. 
I i 
Trade Controls 
A final category of policy intervention includes direct intervention in the market, a nearly opposite 
approach to the market mechanism policy described above. Government market interventions, regulation 
on trade, price controls, quotas, etc. will not prevent the accumulation of middlemen profits and high 
marketing margins, but will widen it due to the increased cost of evading the regulations. By reducing 
competition (i.e. by prohibiting Chinese traders' operating in local towns, as some laws have imposed), the 
likelihood of monopolistic behavior is increased, contradicting the initial goal of the policy. To effectively 
counteract the possible monopoly of middlemen, and to increase prices and incomes received by farmers, 
the government should invest in physical and institutional infrastructures to promote the free market 
mechanism. 
Furthermore, we have seen in both the coffee and nutmeg cases that a cartel structure, while boostinj 
prices in the short terms, is not feasible in the long-term. Accumulation of crops, smuggling, and black 
market trade are all reactions to a cartel structure that does not let the free market operate. Trade control 
are being liberalized by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, through tarrification of non-tariff 
barriers, reduction of tariffs, and the provision of minimum market-access commitments. Since the 
majority of spice crops are exported, elimination of trade controls and compliance with international 
standards would place Indonesia in a favorable position internationally. 
Alternatives for development of rural cash crop farming 
In light of the situation for cash crop farmers, and in particular the cases of coffee and spices, there are 
several possible alternatives to improve the prospects for the farmer in the value chain. The most favorabL 
alternative would allow the farmer to use rupiah for local capital and investment, and receive foreign 
exchange for his exportable crops. The following suggestions would help to achieve this goal, while 
transferring more market power to the farmer: 
• Structure of distribution: a more vertical system, in which farmers participate in more value-added 
activity, would increase the returns to the farmer. Currently the structures is a horizontal, 
decentralized, fragmented system. One way to achieve this is through a cooperative structure, such 
as that in Kenya for specialty coffee. In such a structure, farmers would know the value of their 
crops and may be able to export directly to smaller importers in consuming countries. 
• Value-added: implementation of simple technology for post-harvest processing to add value to raw 
material would eliminate middlemen whose role is to process raw material. The Grenadan oil 
distillery for spices, and the Sumatran method of wet processing are examples of low-tech 
value-added processing. The potential for the value-added items should be carefully studied to 
ensure the investment is worthwhile. Another alternative would be for smallholders to produce 
crops that require minimum post harvest processing. These crops are particularly suitable for 
farmers who have little capital, or are just starting out in cash crop production. Both pepper and 
ginger fall into this category. 
• Financing: generally speaking, government financing schemes that create transparency and 
accountability for the farmer, as well as assist him in production methods and crop education are 
most productive in the long-term. Examples include the package in Grenada, which converts a loan 
into a grant if proper cultivation methods are followed. To involve private banking, the government 
could provide incentives for local banks to provide directed credit, which is focused not only on 
financial assistance but also on assisting farmers implement plans for production, sustainability, 
processing, and marketing of their crops. A pilot study of this is being done by one private bank in 
recommend 
Jakarta, which is comparing this type of financing versus non-directed credit. In this study, farming 
cooperatives use computers to communicate with banks on their cash flow and production. 
Through this technology, banks monitor loan repayments, as well as withdrawal and savings/ deposi 
activity. This allows the bank to detect problems early, minimizing their risk. Under this pilot study, 
electronic data interchange and cash flow monitoring replaces the usual collateral that farmers have 
difficulty supplying. 
Access to technology: possibilities in this arena include improvement in radio broadcasts, radio 
frequencies to access the internet (a project currently being worked on by the Bandung Institute of 
Technology), telephone lines for telephones or PCs, and cellular telephone access (wireless 
communication alternatives). This access would allow farmers to easily get information about 
market prices for different crops. It would also allow for communication between lenders, 
exporters, and buyers of commercial crops. Technology could also be used for farmers to create a 
close relationship with lending institutions, as described above. Finally, the internet provides 
opportunity for farmers to market their crops directly to distributors or end-users, as well as access 
to market research information. The possibility of displaying product images on the Internet opens 
up attractive prospects for promoting new products. The UN Trade Point Development Centre in 
Melbourne has given assistance to developing countries in developing Internet websites through its 
incubator service, http://www.unicc.org/untpdc. Through this program, producers in developing 
countries, even in remote areas, have been able to provide information about their export capacities 
and establish communication with many other business partners at very low operational costs and 
with minimal initial investment. This website, which promotes over 400 products, is aimed at 
distributors rather than end-users or consumers. Similar websites that are focused on promoting 
artisanal products from developing countries include: Newstart, 
http://ottmall.com/newstart/index.htm, Oxfam, http://www.web.net/oxfamgft/index.htm, and Ten 
Thousand Villages, http://www.villages.ca. 
Summary 
Indonesia is experiencing a time of crisis and change, which has hurt many sectors of the economy 
but helped others. The rural agricultural sector is one that has benefited from the rupiah's depreciation, as 
dollar denominated exports translate into many more rupiah. Additionally, agriculture does not require a 
large amount of imported inputs; it is a relatively low-input industry. This has resulted in an uneven crisis; 
while spending in urban areas fell by 10% in the year to August 1998, it actually rose by more than 10% in 
middle-class rural households (McBeth, 1998). In light of these facts, it is an appropriate time for 
Indonesia to focus on developing the agriculture sector. This sector is dominated by smallholder farmers; 
thus, its development serves the dual purposes of stimulating the economy and raising the standard of 
living for the rural majority. 
In order to take advantage of this phenomenon, the government and national organizations can assist 
farmers. One way is through allowing the free market to operate fluidly, by abolishing trade controls, 
improving transportation and communication infrastructure, and providing market information. Direct 
assistance to farmers is also needed to educate farmers on proper cultivation to ensure quality crops, to 
boost yields, and explore opportunities in value-added processing. New technologies, such as e-banking 
and the Internet could also assist farmers in financing and marketing their crops to developed countries. 
Crops identified in this paper that could benefit from all of these initiatives include specialty coffee, pepper, 
cinnamon, and nutmeg. Further study of these and other crops is warranted, to identify which policies are 
most appropriate for each crop. Since all of them have the commonality of smallholder production, 
intercropping, and fragmented distribution, the creation of cooperatives may be a suitable alternative to 
generate more power and increased returns to farmers. The time is ripe for the Indonesian policy-makers 
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